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NO. 19 APRIL 2019 Introduction 
Venezuela, the Region and the World 
Steps for a Possible Way Out of the Crisis 
Claudia Zilla 
Since Nicolás Maduro took over as Venezuela’s president in 2013, the country’s gross 
domestic product and oil production have fallen by more than 50 percent. Political 
institutions, on the other hand, have doubled: there are two legislative bodies, two 
Supreme Courts and, since Juan Guaidó’s self-appointment in early 2019, two com-
peting presidents. The international community is divided – many states stand 
behind the regime, many others behind the opposition. Groups of states are address-
ing the Venezuela issue in various initiatives, without the participation of the parties 
in the conflict. The EU and its member states should refrain from any action that 
could increase the risk of military intervention and bloodshed. Instead, they should 
exert diplomatic pressure to protect the population from repression, hunger and 
disease, and to strengthen the opposition. Furthermore, they should support a con-
flict resolution process that is upheld by national actors and embedded in Latin 
America, and which has democracy as a long-term goal. 
 
At the beginning of 2019, a new dynamic 
developed in the Venezuelan conflict over 
the change of government. After President 
Nicolás Maduro was re-elected in May 2018 
in an early vote that was neither free nor 
fair, he took up his second mandate on 
10 January 2019, for the period up to 2025. 
However, the opposition National Assembly 
(NA) withdrew his mandate. As a result, 
many actors in the international community 
also refused to recognise Maduro as Presi-
dent of Venezuela. Moreover, the NA elected 
Juan Guaidó as its chairman. On 23 Janu-
ary, at a major rally in Caracas, he appointed 
himself interim president of the country. 
Opposition parties and the population 
gathered behind the hitherto largely un-
known, charismatic young politician of the 
Voluntad Popular party, which belongs to the 
Socialist International. He is also backed 
by numerous states that officially recognise 
him in his transitional role, that offer 
humanitarian aid and demand presidential 
elections. Challenged by these develop-
ments, the Maduro government has en-
trenched its repression and its discourse. 
Increased Repression 
Ever since Juan Guaidó declared himself 
interim president and the populace has 
repeatedly demonstrated en masse, the 
Maduro government has been particularly 
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repressive towards its citizens. According 
to a report by the Venezuelan human rights 
organisation Foro Penal, 988 people were 
arbitrarily arrested in Venezuela between 
21 and 31 January 2019. During the same 
period, 35 people were killed by firearms 
and at least eight extrajudicial executions 
are thought to have been carried out. It is 
notable that this time the victims come pre-
dominantly from poorer social strata and 
that some of them are minors. Many took 
part in protests for the first time, some 
were merely nearby. Most arrests (77 per-
cent) took place on 23 January itself, not 
during the demonstrations but after them, 
when citizens were on their way home or 
already back at home. By 20 January 2019 
there were 273 political prisoners in Ven-
ezuela; by 31 January this figure had risen 
dramatically to 942. Among them are 58 
military personnel and 11 minors. 
These victims of the state apparatus are 
abused during their arrest and then tor-
tured in prison (including sexually). They 
are denied legal assistance, medical care 
and often access to food and water. Similar 
practices were already documented in the 
2018 report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 
In addition to militias, units of the 
armed forces and the police are responsible 
for these human rights violations. The Ven-
ezuelan security apparatus can count on 
support from Cuba, the so-called G2 (Grupo 
Dos), for reconnaissance and counterespio-
nage. Military courts have also been crucial, 
particularly since 2014 – not only in trials 
against members of the armed forces, but 
also against civilians accused of rebellion or 
treason, as the International Commission 
of Jurists revealed in a report in 2018. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court in Ven-
ezuela, which is loyal to the regime, has 
responded to a request by the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office and frozen Guaidó’s accounts 
and forbidden him to leave the country. On 
2 April 2019, the Constitutional Assembly 
followed the request of the Supreme Court 
and lifted Guidó’s parliamentary immunity 
paving the way for his prosecution. 
Parallel Institutions 
The power struggle between Maduro and 
Guaidó, which was triggered by the latter’s 
self-declared interim presidency, had already 
been preceded by the doubling of the legis-
lative (2016) and judicial branches (2017). 
Venezuelan democracy was in fact laid 
to rest shortly after the parliamentary elec-
tions of December 2015, when freedom of 
choice was already restricted and the oppo-
sition achieved a landslide victory. As a 
result, the executive and judiciary, which 
were loyal to the regime, systematically and 
drastically curtailed the competences and 
resources of the legislative branch. In 2016, 
Maduro ensured that a constituent assem-
bly was elected under unfair and un-free 
conditions. However, the assembly did not 
draft a constitution, but was busy legislat-
ing. Since then, there have been two par-
liaments that do not recognise each other. 
That same year, the government refused to 
hold a referendum on Maduro’s dismissal, 
despite the fact that the opposition had col-
lected the necessary signatures. Many civil 
servants who had signed were dismissed. 
In 2016 the showdown between the 
government and the NA over the appoint-
ment of judges ended with a co-opting of 
the judiciary by the government. Independ-
ent and opposition lawyers were arrested 
or fled the country. This did not prevent the 
opposition-dominated NA from appointing 
33 judges in July 2017, who now try to hold 
office in exile, mainly in Chile, Colombia, 
Panama and the USA. The so-called Supreme 
Court in Exile or Supreme Court Abroad 
works virtually: members of the various 
specialist chambers communicate weekly 
by conference call via the internet and pro-
cess complaints received via e-mail and 
their own website. A Twitter and Instagram 
account also serve their public relations. 
The decisions of the Supreme Court Abroad 
are neither recognised nor adhered to by 
the Maduro government, such as a ruling 
on 29 October 2018 that sentenced Maduro 
to imprisonment and declared him deposed. 
To reunite these parallel worlds and 
overcome the recurring crises, two nego-
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tiation attempts between the government 
and the opposition were launched in 2016 
and 2017/18, and were accompanied by 
internationally respected public figures 
from other states. However, the negotia-
tions broke off unsuccessfully after a few 
months. 
Constitutional Acrobatics 
Repression, the enforced conformity of the 
organs of government, and the duplication 
of institutions prove that the 1999 consti-
tution, drafted under the government of 
Hugo Chávez, is no longer the basis for gov-
ernment action. Unlike the Latin American 
military dictatorships of the 1960s to 1980s, 
Maduro has tried to underpin his policies, 
repressive measures and manoeuvres with 
state institutions, by invoking the constitu-
tion and elections. This democratic façade 
is likely to be a typical feature of modern 
authoritarian regimes. It does not necessarily 
make them more harmless, but it does 
render them tolerable for longer, both for 
the local population and the international 
community. 
Guaidó is also making legalistic efforts to 
legitimise his self-appointment as interim 
president. When the NA did not recognise 
the presidential elections of May 2018 as 
democratic nor Maduro’s assumption of 
office in January 2019 as legitimate, it passed 
a legislative act on 15 January declaring the 
country’s presidency vacant and Maduro a 
usurper. This situation enabled it to apply 
three constitutional articles. Article 333 
entitles citizens (with or without office or 
mandate) to enforce the Constitution if it 
has been violated or disregarded. Article 
350 grants the people the right to rebel 
against regimes, laws and authorities that 
undermine democratic values and prin-
ciples, and violate human rights. 
While these two articles refer to viola-
tions of the Constitution and the resulting 
right to resist, Article 233 regulates the 
absence of any president. Several cases 
are described, namely death, resignation, 
deposition by the Supreme Court, physical 
or mental incapacity, dismissal by referen-
dum and neglect of office. As one might 
expect, they do not include the current con-
stitutional conflict. Since there is no consti-
tutional provision regulating the current 
situation, the NA refers to an analogous 
case in which Article 233 could be applied. 
If the head of state is absent before taking 
office, under Article 233 presidential elec-
tions shall be held within 30 days. During 
this period, the NA chairman shall take 
over the affairs of government. Guaidó took 
on this role with the NA’s support via his 
very public swearing-in ceremony in Janu-
ary 2019. According to the NA’s decision, 
he now has the threefold task of ending the 
usurpation of the presidency by Maduro, 
forming a transitional government, and 
organising free and transparent elections. 
On 5 February, the NA adopted the 
statute governing the democratic transition 
and the restoration of the Constitution. 
Among other things, it makes the 30-day 
deadline of Article 233 of the Constitution 
more flexible: this now refers to the period 
beginning with the (unspecified) end of 
usurpation and ending with the formation 
of a transitional government. Elections 
should be held as soon as possible and at 
the latest within one year. 
On 15 January, shortly before the tran-
sition statute was adopted, the NA enacted 
the so-called amnesty law. The opposition 
thus altered its strategy vis-à-vis prosecuting 
Chavists and Madurists. The law offers the 
prospect of impunity to those civilians and 
military loyal to the regime who are willing 
to change sides and contribute to the demo-
cratic transition. After Guaidó had been 
sworn in, the text of the law was distributed 
to police and military services in front of 
the international media. Guaidó did not 
even exclude Maduro from the group of po-
tential beneficiaries. The USA supports the 
opposition’s offer, which is as generous as 
it is vague, while human rights organisa-
tions, such as Human Rights Watch, criti-
cise the fact that it does not specify either 
the crimes to be considered or the imple-
mentation process. They argue that due to 
this ambiguity, the amnesty law contradicts 
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the constitution and the international obli-
gations of the Venezuelan state. The num-
ber of deserters in question has so far been 
limited to about 700 – in a state with some 
2,000 generals alone and numerous mili-
tary leaders heading ministries, state com-
panies, and regional executive branches. 
There are also a number of diplomats from 
Venezuela’s embassies who have spoken 
out in favour of Guaidó. 
Excessive International Zeal 
Although in Venezuela lawfulness has long 
been a mere political veneer, and Article 
233 of the Constitution is the weakest pillar 
of Guaidó’s empowerment, many govern-
ments around the world have emphatically 
followed the legalistic argument derived 
from it. They were ready, either immediate-
ly or after an eight-day ultimatum during 
which free elections were supposed to be 
announced, to officially recognise Guaidó’s 
interim presidency and demand that presi-
dential elections be held. Furthermore, the 
USA and other Latin American countries 
welcomed the ambassadors sent by Guaidó. 
Guaidó also visited Colombia, Brazil, Para-
guay, Argentina and Ecuador in late Feb-
ruary and early March 2019. 
By extending their political commitment 
from the legitimacy of Guaidó’s interim 
government to its official recognition, these 
states effectively gave Venezuelan constitu-
tional law precedence over international 
law. On the one hand, it is part of the inter-
national legal tradition and the recognition 
procedure of most states not to recognise 
persons or governments, but rather states. 
On the other hand, according to inter-
national law, recognition is based on the 
actual exercise of power in a state, meaning 
effective control over its armed forces, 
administration and territory. The recogni-
tion of a government under international 
law goes hand in hand with a number of 
privileges and obligations, whose use and 
fulfilment presupposes government effec-
tiveness. The premature recognition of a 
revolutionary government can be seen as 
a violation of the ban on intervention and 
can exacerbate conflicts. This is particularly 
true of present-day Venezuela, since Guaidó, 
as the president recognised by several 
states, could now ask foreign countries for 
military assistance. Although Guaidó’s in-
ternational backing reinforces his political 
weight, the diplomatic step of officially 
recognising his interim presidency further 
foments the conflict. By their explicit par-
tiality, the recognising states unnecessarily 
restrict their room for manoeuvre, e.g. for 
mediation. 
The Politicisation of 
Humanitarian Aid 
The international-law principles of state 
sovereignty and non-interference are in 
tension with the humanitarian principle 
of human protection, which has been en-
hanced by the concept of Responsibility to 
Protect since 2005. This legitimises, under 
strict conditions, military measures for 
the purpose of humanitarian intervention. 
The political struggle for humanitarian 
aid in Venezuela and its connection to 
regime change is currently caught in this 
tense relationship. While the president 
systematically violates human rights, the 
interim president is not in a position to 
protect citizens from these practices. While 
Maduro denies the existence of a humani-
tarian crisis, rejects support from abroad 
and closes the borders, Guaidó leads the Aid 
and Freedom Coalition for Venezuela. This 
recruits aid workers from among Venezue-
la’s population and non-governmental orga-
nisations, and gathers aid supplies from ab-
road (especially from the USA) in neighbour-
ing regions across the Venezuelan border. 
On 23 February, the test of strength be-
tween government and opposition surround-
ing humanitarian aid reached a headline-
grabbing peak when Guaidó took the lead 
in a convoy of lorries carrying relief sup-
plies that started in Cúcuta, Colombia. Fur-
ther aid transports were organised from 
Roraima in Brazil. What had begun with an 
international aid concert and speeches by 
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Guaidó and the presidents of Chile, Colom-
bia, Paraguay and the Secretary-General of 
the Organisation of American States (OAS) 
in Cúcuta ended a few kilometres beyond the 
border crossing in a clash between the con-
voy and Venezuelan military and police. Ac-
cording to Foro Penal, about 60 people were 
injured and at least two killed. Guaidó 
stopped the “humanitarian avalanche”. Via 
Twitter, he officially informed the interna-
tional community that, since Maduro had 
prevented the import of aid, all options 
should now be kept open to liberate Ven-
ezuela. 
Unlike the USA, Latin American and 
European countries, which are on Guaidó’s 
side, unequivocally rule out a military 
option. However, they call on the Maduro 
government to allow humanitarian aid and 
to organise new elections or else resign. 
Given their two-pronged approach, Maduro 
views foreign humanitarian aid as a Trojan 
horse intended to change the balance of 
power, i.e. as an instrument for regime 
change. Against this backdrop, the United 
Nations, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross and the national Red Cross 
societies associated with it have refused to 
participate in relief operations organised 
by Guaidó. Their justification is that the 
principles of international humanitarian 
law – impartiality, neutrality and inde-
pendence (from political objectives, for 
instance) – are not being observed. More 
and more non-governmental organisations 
are raising their voices against the politici-
sation of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, 
for which they hold the government and 
the opposition equally responsible. 
International Sanctions Policy 
Yet many Latin American states, the USA 
and the EU have been steadily increasing 
the pressure on the Maduro regime since 
2017. In August of that year, Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay excluded 
Venezuela from Mercosur, the common 
market of the South, by applying the 
democracy clause. In June 2018, the OAS 
passed a resolution that did not recognise 
the result of the presidential elections and 
noted a breach of the constitutional order 
in Venezuela. The process of withdrawal 
from the OAS, which Venezuela initiated 
with its application in 2017, has now been 
interrupted, after many OAS member states 
recognised Guaidó as the legitimate presi-
dent and after he sent a special representa-
tive to the OAS. The meeting of 14 Latin 
American countries held in August 2017 in 
the Peruvian capital gave rise to the Lima 
Group, which is working to find a peaceful 
solution to the Venezuela crisis. In the 
course of its summit meetings, the group 
has intensified its demands on the Maduro 
government. In its February 2019 statement 
in Bogotá, it declared that Maduro’s hold on 
power was a threat to peace and security 
in the region, and it called on actors in Ven-
ezuela and abroad to officially recognise 
the Guaidó government. In September 
2018, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Paraguay and Peru demanded that the 
International Criminal Court investigate 
the crimes against humanity they claim 
have been committed in Venezuela since 
February 2014. 
The USA, the main buyer of Venezuelan 
oil, has been imposing increasingly harsh 
sanctions against Venezuela since 2015. 
These include visa restrictions, the freezing 
of property and assets, and a ban on U.S. 
citizens and institutions from conducting 
transactions with persons listed on the Spe-
cially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons 
List. Canada followed the US measures 
against Venezuela in September 2017, as 
well as their tightening in May 2018. 
On 28 January 2019, the US Department 
of State and the US Department of Finance 
cancelled the oil deliveries by Venezuela’s 
largest oil company PDVSA. They also trans-
ferred control of its Texas-based subsidiary 
CITGO, and of Venezuelan government 
accounts on US territory, to Guaidó’s interim 
government. 
The EU has had an arms embargo in 
place against Venezuela since November 
2017. In addition, the assets of persons con-
sidered to be key actors in the repressive 
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regime have been frozen. These people have 
also been banned from entering EU coun-
tries. These measures were extended and 
prolonged in March 2018. European coun-
tries such as Switzerland and Norway joined 
the EU sanctions with similar measures. 
The Domino Theory 
For years, Latin America regarded the dis-
mantling of democracy and the rule of law, 
and the aggravation of the humanitarian 
situation in Venezuela as a purely national 
matter. Only as a result of several changes 
of power in the region, the drying up of 
Venezuelan money that flowed into friendly 
states, and the exodus of around four mil-
lion Venezuelans have Latin America’s 
countries become willing to regard the 
“Venezuela problem” as regional. 
In the meantime, however, the Venezuela 
crisis has become more complex not only 
at home but also abroad. Some actors inside 
and outside Latin America suspect that the 
USA’s engagement in Venezuela hides a 
more comprehensive regime change strat-
egy which, in the longer term, will also 
encompass Cuba and Nicaragua. 
This so-called domino theory is lent 
credence not only by statements from the 
US President, his Vice President Mike Pence 
and his national security advisor John Bol-
ton. In January 2019, the Republican Elliott 
Abrams, who had already held foreign 
policy positions under Ronald Reagan and 
George W. Bush, was appointed US envoy 
for Venezuela. Abrams is a highly contro-
versial figure in inter-American relations. 
Serious accusations are associated with his 
name, such as the concealment of human 
rights violations and the arming of groups 
in the Central American conflicts during 
the 1980s. In addition, Senator Marco 
Rubio, the son of Cuban emigrants and 
a proponent of a tough policy towards 
Havana, acts as an informal foreign policy 
advisor (and sometimes government spokes-
man) on Latin American issues. Rubio rep-
resents the state of Florida, which has a 
large Latin American electorate. 
Members of the Venezuelan opposition 
also fuel the domino theory. Julio Borges, 
member of the NA, confirmed during a 
press conference in the USA that the cur-
rent struggle is not only about Venezuela, 
but also about Cuba and Nicaragua, and 
freedom in the whole region. He also used 
the metaphor of a Berlin Wall that had not 
yet fallen in Latin America, implicitly 
referring to a new Cold War. 
Domino theories and Cold War analogies, 
however, have a devastating effect on con-
flict resolution because they broaden the 
circle of parties in the conflict and promote 
the hardening of positions and thus con-
frontation. It is true that other foreign 
actors besides the USA are also involved 
in the Venezuela conflict, above all Cuba, 
China and Russia. However, their role is 
likely to remain limited due to narrowly 
defined priorities. Havana is likely to with-
draw its security experts from Venezuelan 
institutions as soon as “21st century social-
ism” is no longer Venezuela’s state ideol-
ogy. China is Venezuela’s main creditor, 
and its key concern is contractual security, 
meaning the repayment of its loans. Mos-
cow, on the other hand, has a strong inter-
est in keeping US interference in Venezuela 
to a minimum. 
Dialogue instead of Violence 
The international engagement in the Ven-
ezuelan conflict should give priority to 
humanitarian protection, contribute to de-
escalation, focus on the Venezuelan actors, 
and ensure that any dialogue process is em-
bedded in Latin America. Europe would 
have a role to play in supporting the regional 
framework. 
Humanitarian protection. The international 
community should work towards the Maduro 
regime refraining from repressive measures, 
releasing political prisoners, and allowing 
humanitarian aid by neutral actors. For his 
part, Guaidó should refrain from politicis-
ing it. Simultaneously, his physical integ-
rity and freedom must be strictly protected. 
The path to holding democratic new elec-
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tions would then have to be smoothed 
in talks between government and opposi-
tion – a presidential election is essential, 
but parliament or regional executives could 
be elected at the same time. This would 
mean moving away from political maxi-
mum goals in favour of immediate humani-
tarian protection for the population. 
De-escalation. International pressure on 
authoritarian regimes can certainly con-
tribute to their erosion and give the oppo-
sition some protection. However, a policy 
of regime change from outside only leads 
to sustainable democracies in exceptional 
cases, even if the call for help came from 
inside the country. It is therefore impera-
tive to avoid a situation where US engage-
ment on the Venezuela issue supplants 
the role of Venezuelan society and Latin 
America, giving the whole process the 
character of an externally imposed regime 
change. If the conflict escalates, US support 
for Guaidó must also be prevented from 
leading to military intervention. The risk 
of violent chaos with an impenetrable net-
work of numerous state, para-state, social 
and criminal actors would be extremely 
great. 
National focus. In early 2019, the Venezue-
la conflict became highly internationalised. 
A constructive approach to tackling the 
crisis requires a focus on national actors. 
Guaidó’s fresh and dynamic charisma was 
decisive in upgrading the NA and convinc-
ingly representing it in public as well as 
remobilising the population. For the initial 
phase of dialogue with the regime, it is im-
portant to keep the circle of participants 
small. During the transition process, how-
ever, other national actors (such as trade 
unions, associations, churches, the student 
movement, representatives of a critical 
Chavism) should also be involved so as to 
lay eventual foundations for the social 
anchoring of democracy and reconstruction 
in good time. 
Latin American embedding. Latin America 
is today divided between those governments 
that stand behind the Maduro regime and 
those that are pushing for change. In the 
latter group, there is no agreement on the 
question of whether Guaidó should be 
recognised. Mexico and Uruguay are pur-
suing a middle course with the proposed 
“Montevideo mechanism”, which is also 
supported by Caribbean states and Bolivia. 
This mechanism is a four-phase process to 
overcome the crisis – comprising dialogue, 
negotiation, commitments and implemen-
tation – whereby new elections are not a 
prerequisite for talks, but a possible out-
come. The emphasis on building trust and 
an openness to results was one of the 
strengths of the concept; it did not, how-
ever, develop any momentum. Neither the 
two main countries nor the three personali-
ties who were supposed to promote rap-
prochement between the conflict parties 
were able to develop the necessary diplo-
matic traction. 
EU support for a Latin American group of 
states. While the EU is divided on the ques-
tion of recognising Guaidó’s interim presi-
dency, it has nonetheless been able to form 
an international contact group, which joined 
in a meeting with other Latin American 
countries in Uruguay on 7 February. The 
governments of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecu-
ador, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom were represented. 
The divergent positions could provide a 
resource for forming a politically balanced 
small group of Latin American states, 
whose involvement is acceptable to both 
sides and which opens a first channel of 
communication between the government 
and opposition. The expectations and con-
ditions to be established in this way should 
not cover regime change, but the launch 
of a dialogue process between the conflict 
parties. Such an initiative would not be the 
first, but the context would have changed. 
This time the talks could be more confiden-
tial and involve Cuba as a guarantor. The 
group should present itself to the Maduro 
government and the armed forces support-
ing it as a “peaceful alternative” to the 
menacing option of a US intervention. The 
negotiations would have to specify con-
cessions to the regime, which would cer-
tainly include more than a vague promise 
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of amnesty. It should be clarified which 
countries will accept the amnestied actors. 
The EU should intensively facilitate such a 
dialogue process, and provide advisory and 
technical assistance to the Latin American 
group. 
Finally, those actors within the Venezue-
lan opposition and the international com-
munity who reject both military interven-
tion and negotiations should be reminded 
of a simple principle: anyone who is for 
change and does not want to fire a weapon 
must speak out. This is the only real alter-
native to civil war. 
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